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Abstract 
While gender offers valuable perspectivesforunderstanding migration law, masculinityhas 
received little attention. In family migration, men are generally regarded as economic agents 
and family as marginal to their lives, a view that is difficult to dislodge because it serves the 
purposes of governments anxious to reduce unwanted immigration. In British immigration 
law, measures have often explicitly or implicitly relied on such gender-based 
assumptions.Recently, lawyers have utilised the gap between official and unofficial 
standardsby promoting test casesinvolvingeither a woman or a vulnerable man but where the 
principles established will benefit all migrants. Gains may be short-lived however as new 
ways emerge of making distinctions.  These arguments aredemonstrated in this article 
through examination of British immigration control andjudicial decisions. The articlefinds 
that, in this arena, new understandings of masculinity and fatherhood have yet to make much 
impact. 
 
 
  
'A Thing Apart': ControllingIrregular Male Family Migrants in the UK 
Introduction 
This article examines howmale family migrants, particularly those without 
immigration status (irregular migrants),have fared within the British immigration system.Two 
decisions made by the UK’s highest court, now the Supreme Court but then the House of 
Lords, are the focus for a discussion of the difficulties in using law to challenge gender 
stereotypes in immigration control, in particular, the assumption that family migration is a 
predominantly female category and thatmale family migrants areliable to instrumentalise and 
manipulate their family ties for their personal advantage, including an immigration advantage 
These difficulties are even greater for irregular migrants, in the UK as elsewhere, a 
group that includes those who overstayed their visa, those who entered without leave(the term 
used in immigration law for permission to enter or remain in  the UK) and, in particular, 
asylum seekers whose claim to refugee status has been refused.Living clandestinely or 
stranded for many years while questions of legal status are determined, they inevitably put 
down roots in the UK. Ties of intimacy and parenthood create a potentially powerful claim 
for permanent admission, particularly given the incorporation into British law of human 
rights norms, including the right to respect for family life. Yet recognition of such claims 
risks undermining national immigration controls, the effectiveness of which is commonly 
regarded as a signifier of governmental competence. This tension is inflected by gender as the 
majority of such irregular migrants are male and the way out of the dilemma for the 
government and, in almost all cases, the courts is through the minimisation of the strength of 
family ties. This is not new. Gender equality norms mean that open discrimination is both 
unlawful and unacceptable, but this article shows that men with family claims in general, not 
only irregular migrants,have been persistently excluded or marginalised by British 
immigration law, often in disguised or invisible ways. 
Using the law to remedy such marginalisation is not straightforward.Test-cases which 
challenge the officially gender-neutral policies will usually be broughtbythoseseen as likely 
to makethe strongest possible impression on the court and, in family migration cases, this is 
most often a woman, usually a mother, or a man who possessesadditional characteristics of 
vulnerability.In principle, this is a sensible strategy. Subsequent male applicants should 
benefit from the precedents established bytheir more favourably perceived predecessors. 
However, these advantages are less stable and secure than they might otherwise be; it is not 
  
difficult to find factual differences between cases whichmean that the precedent does not 
need to be followed in cases involving those men(the majority) who invoke less immediate 
sympathy.  In addition, immigration law changes constantly and new gender dimensions are 
perceptible in recent policies which, as discussed at the end of this article, have reinforced the 
difficulties faced by men making applications to enter or remain in the UK because of family 
ties. 
The introduction to this collection has shown that men and women experience 
migration and are treated by policy-makers in different ways, but that the male experience 
and official perceptions of men have not been much examined; ‘gendered’ has often meant 
‘female’. The obstacles and discriminationfaced by women migrants (Piper 2006: 140)and 
the focus on them as the embodiment of culture and ethnicity (Yuval Davis and Anthias 
1989; Roggeband and Merloo 2007) needed exploration. Yet,to overlook the specific male 
experience results in an incomplete picture, as conceptualisations of male migrantsarean 
equally crucial part of the regulatory landscape. Masculinity, in generalhowever, is largely 
invisible and rarely scrutinised (Mahler and Pessar 2006: 50-51; Kimmel 1993) and this is 
particularly the case in migration. This is not an abstract question. In family migration, the 
treatment of men has ramifications for the whole family unit, causing hardship and emotional 
pain for women(or men in same sex relationships) and children whose partners and fathers 
are refused admission. Another way to address this question would be to focus on the denial 
of the citizenship right to live in one’s home with one’s partner or parent, an insider 
perspective that is usually adopted when discussing family migration (Carens 2003; Lister 
2010; De Hart 2009). However, this denial is partially enabled by the attribution of negative 
characteristics to men and this is the subject of study in this collection and this article.
i
 
Masculinity, like femininity, is a variable social construction that exists in relation to 
other social constructions. Academic commentators have been eager to stress the plurality 
and mutability of masculinities, and their relational and socially-constructed nature (Connell 
and Messerschmidt 2005). Nonetheless, there is a persistent risk of essentialism and 
stigmatisation as masculinity becomes associated with negative qualities and toxic practices 
(Connell and Messerschmidt 2005: 840).In this article, it is shown that the emotional 
attachments of migrant men are regarded as insufficient to overcome thebarriers to admission 
                                                          
i
Women who marry ‘unsuitable’ men are themselves often the subject of dismissive judgments (see Wray 
2006a). 
  
created by their irregular status,despite sometimes compelling evidence that the men in 
question are deeply involved in child care and family life. This marginalisation of their 
emotional lives is reinforced by socially accepted renderings of masculinityand serves the 
larger purpose of justifying the exclusion of men whose presence is undesirable principally 
because of their economic, ethnicand immigration position. 
Masculinity’s intersection with other characteristics makes for hierarchical 
relationships not only between genders, but between men (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005: 
846).Many of the negative qualities attributed to migrant menin situations of irregularity 
(insubordination, disobedience, obstinacy) might as easily be characterised positively 
(ambition, autonomy, resilience), had theybelonged to more privileged categories in terms of 
class, race and status. Those menwhose claims to admission are dismissed are viewedby the 
state, and often by courts, as masculine within a feminised arena and are penalised for it. As 
Connell (2010) and others have pointed out, the benefits of masculinity have always been 
unevenly distributed. The masculine characteristics attributed to them, far from being a 
source of power, are an instrument to be used against them, even if these characteristics are 
not, from a state perspective, their predominant defect.  
This all takes place in a context in which transnational family life, in general, is 
regarded as highly problematic because it represents a significant challenge to state 
sovereignty over entry. This is even more the case when the migrant in question has not 
entered through state-approved channels but is an irregular migrant or asylum seeker. As this 
article will show, it is only through using a woman or vulnerable man as the paradigm that 
even a sympathetic court has been able to legitimise family life claims in this framework. The 
claims for admission of migrant men, irregular migrant men in particular, can be expressed in 
the feminised domainof family life and the contested arena of immigration law only through 
de-masculinisation or infantilisation (cf. Griffiths, this volume, on similar processes in the 
field of asylum). The problem is that the gains for all men have not been substantial. 
In recent years, scholars have identified new models of fatherhood which, to some 
degree,reshapethe characteristics of masculinity and which should have enabledsome men to 
make a more powerful claim based on their family lives (see Dermott 2008, Collier and 
Sheldon 2008).The ‘new fatherhood’ does not replace but rather adds an extra layer to ideals 
of masculinity as De Hart’s discussion of Superdadsin this collection demonstrates. However, 
as the introduction to this collection shows, there is little consensus and much scepticism as 
to the social reality of these models (see, for example, Collier and Sheldon 2008: 103-137, 
  
Drakich 1989, Fineman 2001; Dowd 2012) and, as this article will show, they have had 
relatively little impact on how migrant fathers are conceptualised. In most cases, thecourts 
have been able to avoid recognising the complexity and depth of migrant fathers’ 
relationships with their children and, in this way, have also avoided any fundamental 
challenge to the integrity of state control over immigration. The state meanwhile has resisted 
even limited incursions by the courts and has also proved adept at fashioning new forms of 
control that perpetuate the marginalisation of male family migrants. 
The next section of this article provides a brief account of the common law and 
human rights framework in which the cases discussed in this article have been determined. 
The following section looks at the longstanding problematisation of migrant men seeking 
admission to the UK as family members. The article then traces the post-Human Rights Act 
case law on the position of irregular migrant spouses until the time that the House of Lords 
became involved. The section that follows analyses two key House of Lords cases that 
demonstrate how even judgments that advance the interests of migrants rely on gender in 
ways that, as the article goes on to show, risk diminishing the breadth of their impact. The 
article ends by briefly considering recent developments that reinforce the relative exclusion 
of men making claims to enter or remain on the basis of family life. 
Migrants, Gender, the Courts and Human Rights  
Both legislators and courts have, sometimes explicitly but more often implicitly, 
regarded the paradigmatic family migrant as female, and men who claim admission as a 
family migrant as suspect by reason of their gender. It will be argued thatthe UK’s highest 
court partially succeeded in amelioratingthe disadvantages caused by this heavily gendered 
perspective but did not dismantle the underlying gender assumptions. This argument relies on 
the relationship between fact and law in legal reasoning. 
In common law jurisdictions such as the UK, US and Commonwealth countries, the 
doctrine of precedent applies.Lower courts and tribunals,when faced with ‘similar fact’ cases 
to those already decided by higher courts, must follow legal rules established inthose 
highercourts. This ensures a degree of stability and predictability as well as gradual evolution 
in the law. Nonetheless,judicial reasoning is a flexible instrument. Judges can, at least within 
  
limits, select from a range of factual narratives so as to fit the case within their preferred legal 
outcome.In essence, they are reasoning by analogy, but have some freedom to decide the 
extent to which an analogy exists.
ii
This task has been made more complex in British 
jurisdictions by the injection of human rights norms and jurisprudence by the Human Rights 
Act 1998. Human rights embody general principles rather than prescriptive rules, and the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights does not operate a doctrine of 
precedent. Although it has adopted many principles to deal with recurring factual scenarios, 
compared to the jurisprudence of the English courts, the Strasbourg jurisprudence often 
appears inconsistent and open-ended. 
In the years following implementation of the Human Rights Act, courts and tribunals 
in the UK had to integrate human rights norms and approaches to the law into their decision-
making. This was a challenge in many areas but especially in immigration where there is a 
tradition of particular respect for government control (Bevan 1986, Legomsky 1987 and 
Griffiths 1997). Tribunals and lower courts were reluctant to use human rights laws to 
undermine policy on the admission or removal of migrants, particularly for family migrants 
whose claims were made under ECHR article 8, the right to respect for private and family 
life, a qualified right whose application to migrants had been developed only slowly and in 
sometimes inconsistent or confusing ways by the Strasbourg Court. That reluctance was 
expressed in two ways: by a narrow interpretation of the legal reach of article 8 and by the 
designation of almost all migrants as outside the limited range of factual situations in which 
article 8 could apply. The result was a series of appeals and judicial reviews brought by these 
migrants, which passed through the court hierarchy to the House of Lords (which later 
became the Supreme Court), who eventually ordered a broader approach to the application of 
article 8 to migrants. 
In determining that almost all migrants fell outside article 8, judges constructed 
categories of meritorious and unmeritoriousclaims. Such constructions were based on 
attributions that were markedly, if implicitly, determined by gender.The argument is not that 
tribunals and courts discriminated openly against men; the minority of women who brought 
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Whether judges have discretion at all, and, if so, its nature and extent, is a vastly contested field in 
jurisprudence although predominantly concerned with the application of legal rules. The critiques of legal 
realists and critical legal scholars are particularly relevant to a discussion of how judges determine facts (for a 
general discussion, see, for example, Penner2008, chapters 4 and 10).  
 
  
claims did not routinelyreceive more sympathy.  However, in key cases that established 
precedents prior to the House of Lords’ involvement, judges asserted a broad unmeritorious 
category based on the disobedient and opportunistic irregular migrant. Conversely, when the 
House of Lords sought to widen the deserving category, they justified their findings by 
creating a new and different figure, the individual with strong and vital family ties. In 
creating these contrasting types, there was a reliance on unspoken gender distinctions. The 
former category was typically male, the latter either female or male but with characteristics of 
vulnerability.  
When bringing test cases, lawyers select parties who are most likely to elicit 
sympathy for their cause according to conventional norms, including those of gender, a 
common and sensible strategy.  Gender is an inadmissible ground for treating cases 
differently and, if a test case using a woman or a de-masculinised man succeeds, all men in 
similar situations should benefit. However, it does mean that the marginalisation of these 
more representative but less sympathetic cases is never challenged. The danger is that 
unofficial gender distinctions can easily be resurrected. ‘Facts’ are unstable constructions; as 
demonstrated below, the same migrant may, in one light, appear as an opportunistic 
manipulator and, in another, as a victim. It is rarely difficult to rationalise consigning 
members of a less favoured group to the unmeritorious category. The result in this area was 
that decisions at the highest level had only a limited effect on lower level decision-making, 
and assumptions about the marginal character of men’s emotional livesremained largely 
untouched. 
The Problematic (Male) Family Migrantin the UK 
In the past, British regulation of migration drew heavily on conventional gender 
norms, while family migration barely existed as a separate category.  Prior to the Immigration 
Act 1971, alien workers were assumed to be male and could be accompanied by their wives 
and children. There was no corresponding right for women; they had to rely on administrative 
discretion. From the mid-nineteenth century until the British Nationality Act 1948, bi-
national families were invisible as wives adopted (or were treated as adopting) the nationality 
of their husbands, and families were regarded as a single unit, either as citizens or aliens.  
Even after nationality law changed, the small numbers entering international marriages meant 
that migrant spouses were regarded as easily absorbed (see Wray 2011 28-32).  Family 
migration only became an issue after the imposition of immigration controls on non-white 
  
Commonwealth migrants under the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962. Before that time, 
all Commonwealth citizens had the legal right to enter and live in the UK (although, 
throughout the 1950s, there were attempts to limit the entry of Caribbean and South Asian 
workers through administrative means).  
Many Commonwealth migrants had entered without their families and single non-
white male migrant workers were seen as sexually predatory, dangerous, and responsible for 
a variety of ills including an increased incidence of sexually transmitted disease (Wray 2011: 
chapter 2). When immigration restrictions were first placed on Commonwealth nationals in 
1962, there was no desire to restrict the entry of family members; quite the reverse, their 
entry was seen as essential, but on a gendered basis. The 1962 Act granted wives and minor 
children a statutory right to enter. Some women MPs suggested replacing the word ‘wife’ by  
‘spouse’ but the government declined because ‘[i]n the Bill, as in our nationality law, we 
have assumed the husband is the head of the family and that the wife acquires his domicile’ 
(quoted in Wray 2011:43). Husbands could enter only at the discretion of immigration 
officers, not under statute. In the following years, family migration increased vastly as 
migrants had to decide definitively whether to stay or leave, knowing that subsequent re-entry 
would be impossible. Many stayed and called for their families. Over time, their children 
became of age to marry and often turned to the country of origin for a spouse. As early as 
1965, family migration was perceived as a problem and, once its restriction became a policy 
aim, men were the primary target.  In part this was because the entry of women and children 
could not be controlled except by statutory amendment. Instead, administrative measures 
were used to prevent their entry, causing widespread anguish and damage to families. These 
included delays often of a decade or more, hostile interviews, absurd findings as to 
‘discrepancies’ and intimate physical examinations (‘virginity tests’; see Juss 1997 and Wray 
2011: chapter 5).However, there was nothing in law to prevent the statutory provision being 
repealed (as eventually happened). The obstacles to repeal were political; there was still 
widespread acceptance that women and children had a strong claim so that refusals had to be 
semi-covert.  
No such difficulties were engaged when the admission of men was in issue. Fathers 
aged between 60 and 65 were prohibited from entry in 1968 and, in 1969, the entry of all 
Commonwealth husbands was ended unless ‘special features’ were present. The latter change 
was instigated after 1,676 men were admitted for marriage in 1968, and it was believed that 
  
marriage was being used ‘as a means of entering, working and settling in the UK outside of 
the employment voucher scheme’ (Wray 2011: 48, chapter 3).  
The ban on Commonwealth husbands, exceptions to which favoured the husbands of 
white women, remained in place until 1974.After this, measures were adoptedthat were more 
refined in their ability to filter out the least desirable migrants: males from non-white 
countries. The ‘primary purpose rule’ required the applicant to demonstrate to official 
satisfaction that the primary purpose of the marriage was not to enter the United Kingdom 
(Sachdeva 1993). Many husbands were refused on primary purpose grounds despite years of 
married life and the birth of children. The rule became an emblem of institutional contempt 
for male migrants’ claims to enter as family members, and caused immense emotional 
distress to their British wives (Menski 1992).Although some concessions were later 
introduced, the rule relied on assumptions about men’s lack of emotional commitment to 
family life and the predominance of economic motivationsso that significant numbers would 
make a vital, lifelong commitment primarily for immigration reasons. 
The primary purpose rule was abolished in 1997 by the Labour government. This 
marked the beginning of a more complex and fluid period in the relationship between gender 
and family migration (for a discussion of family migration policy in the period, see Wray 
2013a). In its immigration policy, as elsewhere, the government sought to present itself as 
responsive to the concerns of its ethnic minority electorate. Other differences with the past 
included a commitment to increases in skilled labour migration and to ‘modern’ forms of 
relationship, including recognition of same sex and unmarried relationships. Acceptance rates 
for migrant partners(male and female) increased, and overt gender discrimination was 
contrary to the spirit of the times as well as to the law. However, the government soon found 
itself under pressure from elsewhere. Concern about perceived failures of integration by 
minority ethnic communities soon brought marriage back into focus, this time through a 
cultural lens (cf Bonjour and De Hart 2013).  In responding to these challenges, government 
discourse appeared more inclusive, language was neutrally formulated, and issues of gender 
and race were handled with more subtlety than before. For instance, in its consultation 
document Marriage to Partners from Overseas(Border and Immigration Agency 2007),case 
studies of forced marriages included male victims and a range of nationalities. However, 
debate did not take place in a vacuum. Particular combinations of race and gender were 
understood as highly problematic, and questions of forced and bogus marriage were 
associated in the popular imagination with oppression of women by non-white,often Muslim 
  
men, an increasingly common policy frame in the UK and parts of Europe (Razack 2004; 
Roggeband and Verloo 2007; Bonjour & De Hart 2013). 
Meanwhile, large if temporary increases in asylum claims and irregular migration 
resulted in near chaos in the asylum system (McKee 2005: 254; Somerville 2007: 65; Home 
Office 2008). Long delays became routine and theremoval of failed asylum seekers was 
difficult for legal and practical reasons. Those who remained joined the growing pool of 
irregular migrants, which also included those who had entered without leave or had 
overstayed their visas. Woodbridge (2005) estimated that, in 2001, there were about 400,000 
irregular migrants in the UK. Using similar methodology, Gordon et al (2009) suggested a 
population of about600,000by the end of 2007. There was thus a substantial and 
increasingpool of very poor, excluded migrants without status and unable to work legally. 
The gender ratio of undocumented migrantsis unknown (Vollmer 2011) as they are not 
monitored. More is known about the subset of this group which comprised failed asylum 
seekers. In 2002, 74%, and, in 2007,70%of asylum claims were made by men. 91% of 
asylum detainees in 2002, and 79% in 2007 were male. In 2007, 81% of those leaving 
voluntarily or removed were male (Home Office 2003; 2008). Not all irregular migrants were 
failed asylum seekers but it seems likelythat men also formed a majority of this larger 
category. 
Irregular migrants, whether failed asylum seekers, overstayers or others, might remain 
in the UK for many years. Many formed relationships with British citizens or residents. Until 
2002, they could apply to remain in the UK on the basis of marriage but the rules then 
changed so that migrants without leave or with less than six month’s leave (usually visitors) 
had to leave the UK and apply for a marriage visa from abroad. Although the rationale was 
the number of suspected sham marriages, claims about the extentof these were largely 
speculative (Wray 2006).Those most affected were not visitors or other regular migrants; 
they usually came from stable regions and had some financial security and were 
inconvenienced and delayed but not, on the whole, refused. More seriously affected were 
irregular migrants, for whom securing return to the UK was more difficult. Many came from 
troubled regions where political and economic conditions, absence of passport facilities or the 
need for exit visas, and the withdrawal of UK embassy facilities made obtaining the 
necessary visa difficult. In the meantime, family life, including with children, was disrupted 
with sometimes long term consequences.  
  
Unsurprisingly, many affected migrants tried to rely on ECHR article 8, the right to 
respect for private and family life, to remain in the UK. This was a relatively recent 
possibility. Until implementation of the Human Rights Act 1998, those resisting removal on 
the basis of marriage to UK residents had only government policy or judicial review 
principles upon which to rely, and claims rarely succeeded (see Wray 2011: 175-190). New 
opportunities were presented by the ability to bring a domestic human rights claim based on 
respect for family life, which required interference in such family life to be lawful, necessary 
in the interests of one of a number of defined aims, and proportionate.
1
 However, early 
immigration decisions under article 8 provided little assistance. For several years, the courts 
maintained that their function was to apply ‘anxious scrutiny’2 to the government’s own 
decision and overturned only ‘exceptional’ cases. That position changed after the 2007 House 
of Lords decision in Huang which found that appellate bodies should reach their own 
decision on what article 8 requires and that they were not bound by a condition of 
exceptionality.
3
 This was a critical decision and the origin of well-publicised recent disputes 
between the judiciary and the government about the fate of irregular migrants and foreign 
criminals with family ties in the UK. As well as the legal questions in issue however, the case 
is notable for the way that the Court talked about family migrants, emphasising their 
humanity and the importance of their family lives: 
Human beings are social animals. They depend on others. Their family, or 
extended family, is the group on which many people most heavily depend, 
socially, emotionally and often financially. There comes a point at which, for 
some, prolonged and unavoidable separation from this group seriously 
inhibits their ability to live full and fulfilling lives (para. 18). 
The two House of Lords cases, discussed in this article, Chikwamba and EB 
(Kosovo),were decided after the decision in Huang.
4
  They involved a challenge under article 
8 by irregular migrants to the policy of requiring them to leave the UK to apply for leave to 
re-enter as a spouse. The specific issues addressed in them were, firstly, whether a blanket 
policy was proportionate (Chikwamba) and, secondly, the effect of government delay on the 
proportionality of removal(EB (Kosovo)). They were among a series of cases on family 
migration heard by the UK’s highest court (see Wray 2013 for a wider discussion) and have 
been selected for discussion here because, unusually at this level, the judgments involved 
some detailed consideration of individual circumstances. They are therefore good examples 
of how gender norms can be subtly expressed through law.Before turning to these judgments 
  
however, the next section will consider how such instanceshad previously been treated by the 
lower courts. 
Decisions Before Chikwamba and EB (Kosovo): Excluding the Problem Male Migrant 
The issues in Chikwamba and EB (Kosovo) had already been litigated by migrants at 
length in the Tribunal and lower courts without success. Most were decided before Huang 
held that there was greaterauthority to intervene, and were unsuccessful.But, even after 
Huang, the majority failed.The protagonists in these cases were overwhelmingly male. For 
example, of 36 lower-level decisions on the issue decided in Chikwamba and surveyed for 
this article, 31 involved male applicants.The exclusion of this mainly male group was more 
palatable if they could be designated as generally unmeritorious.Constructing an undeserving 
applicant meant emphasising their misconduct, minimising the significance of their affective 
ties, and maximising their resilience to the hardship of removal. This was done in ways that 
relied implicitly on gender. 
This is illustrated by two key Court of Appeal decisions. Both involved male failed 
asylum seekers. Mahmoodin the Court of Appeal concerned a Pakistani national who had 
entered the UK clandestinely, made an asylum claim and, shortly before this was refused, 
married a British citizen born in Pakistan.
5
The marriage was acknowledged as genuine and 
the couple had two children. The Court did not regard the case as meeting the demanding 
legal criteria by which it believeditself bound. In particular, it wasconsidered reasonable for 
his family to accompany him to Pakistan, or for him to be separated from them while the 
application was processed, which might be a lengthy period. As already discussed, the idea 
that a wife and family should follow a husband has a long pedigree in immigration law, and 
was one reason why claims by men to enter the UK havebeen regarded suspiciously.  Here, 
the separation of father and children seems to have been regarded as not very significant. In 
deciding against the migrant, the court did not have to overcome the dissonance on these 
questions that might have arisen had the appellant been female. 
In the otherleading Court of Appeal decision, the Court was faced with an 
unsympathetic appellant with a weak claim.In Ekinci, a Turkish asylum seeker resisted return 
to Germany, where he had previously made an asylum claim, because of his marriage to a 
British citizen.
6
 He lied in his new asylum claim to conceal the previous claim, 
abscondedseveral times, and married his wife after lengthy proceedings to procure his 
removal. The claim against removal failed, but this was not a case in which family relocation 
  
was possible, as Mrs Ekinciwas confined to the UK by her caring responsibilities.  Instead, 
the key finding was that Mr Ekinci should not ‘jump the queue’ by being allowed to make his 
application in-country.  Thisfinding was made in the knowledge that he faced return only to 
Germany, and a short wait for his claim to be considered. Mr Ekinci appeared to epitomise 
the manipulative male migrant prepared to use any means, including the opportunistic 
exploitation of family ties, to advance his case. While the casehad some complexities (the 
marriage was genuine, the couple had a child, and the entry clearance application was not 
assured of successso thatlong term separation was possible), it was a set of facts that was 
mostly congruent with the popular image of the undeserving male migrant and there was 
again little or no dissonance to overcome between the facts of the case and the outcome.  
These cases were subsequently  interpreted in the tribunal and the lower courts as 
showing that removal of irregular migrants was justified either because the family did not 
face ‘insurmountable obstacles’ in relocating abroad, an almost impossible standard, or 
because anirregular migrant should not ‘jump’ the entry clearance queue by remaining in the 
UK. The consequence was that almost all subsequent claims, usually but not always 
involving male claimants, failed. This was not aninevitability. Lower courts and tribunals 
were bound by these precedents in similar fact cases but they also, for the most part, 
interpreted themexpansively and wereslow to find that cases also involving irregular migrants 
but where the facts were not the same should be treated differently (‘distinguished’).  The 
category of undeserving applicant thus widened and brought into its ambit many male 
applicants with compelling claims.  
Even fathers and husbands who showeda strongcommitment to their families, and 
whose presence was essential emotionally and practically, did not succeed.For instance, the 
Immigration Appeal Tribunal followed Mahmoodin a case where important factual 
differences were present: the father was the primary carer of his son while his wife worked, 
the wife was a British citizen who had never lived in Pakistan and whose skin complaint was 
exacerbated by hot weather. The Tribunal considered return to be justified because the 
separation was likely to be only temporary, ignoring the disruption to the wife who might 
have to abandon her teaching job, and to the child, who would be separated from his daily 
carer, a hardship that barely merited mention.
7
Inanother instance, the Tribunal upheld 
removal where the migrant’s child was severely disabled, the father was deeply involved in 
her care, and the mother could not cope with this daughter and their other child on her own.  
The family would move ontobenefits as a result of the father’s departure, making a successful 
  
application under the immigration rules less likely given the ‘no recourse to public funds’ 
requirement.
8In dismissing the case, the Tribunal reduced the husband’s contribution to its 
practical elements, discussing how these might be overcome, and ignored the emotional 
connection between the family members. In yet other cases, it was conditions in the country 
of origin that were in issue and applicants were expected to show a high degree of physical 
and emotional resilience. For instance, an applicant was required by the tribunal to return to 
Iraq shortly after the second Gulf war, obtain travel documents in this unstable environment, 
undertake the expensive and dangerous journey from Iraq to Jordan, negotiate Jordanian 
border controls and then stay in a hotel while awaiting a visa decision that could have as 
easily been made in the UK.
9
 
Those relatively few women who brought cases did not necessarily fare better.The 
same legal principles applied to both genders, but they had been established through reliance 
on the representation of the problematic and suspect irregular male migrant which then 
expanded to include all men and the few women who applied.  
Chikwamba and EB (Kosovo) 
The suggestion that gender was an important factor in establishing the foundations for 
this broad category is reinforced by the cases in which the House of Lords reversed these 
principles. The decisions in Chikwambaand EB (Kosovo) were made on the same day in 
2008.Chikwambaconcerned a married migrant present without leave in the UK. The sponsor 
was a Zimbabwean refugee who could not return, and the couple had a daughter. The 
appellant seemed as compliant an irregular migrant as it was possible to be, being a failed 
asylum seeker permitted to remain temporarily when removals to Zimbabwe were suspended. 
The issue of removal arose only after that policy was reversed. The period of separation 
would be at least of several months duration. The Court found that a blanket policy requiring 
return to the country of origin to make an entry clearance application was disproportionate 
and distinguished cases such as this one from Ekinci, finding that‘… only comparatively 
rarely, certainly in family cases involving children, should an article 8 appeal be dismissed on 
the basis that it would be proportionate and more appropriate for the appellant to apply for 
leave from abroad’ (para 44). Lord Scott expressed himself even more memorably: ‘… 
policies that involve people cannot be, and should not be allowed to become, rigid inflexible 
rules. The bureaucracy of which Kafka wrote cannot be allowed to take root in this country 
and the courts must see that it does not’ (para. 4). 
  
The appellant in Chikwambawas a woman. That was not an explicit factor, but the 
intention of selecting this case for appeal would be to present the Court with the opposite of 
the undeserving, male migrant epitomised by Mr Ekinci. This well-behaved female migrant 
was at the opposite end of the spectrum in all respects, including her gender. The impact this 
had on reasoning is sometimes discernible, particularly when it concerns the parent/child 
relationship.One of the judges, Baroness Hale, referred to the choice between separation of 
daughter and mother or joint travel to the ‘harsh and unpalatable’(para 8) conditions in 
Zimbabwe. She did not mention the father’s position.Another judge, Lord Scott assumed that 
she could not leave her daughter behind and did not mention the father’s relationship with the 
child. Lord Brown also assumed that the girl would accompany her mother, and the painful 
separation of father and daughter was mentioned literally only in parentheses.It should be 
recalled that courts had previously regarded the likely separation of fathers and children with 
equanimity, as the cases just discussed show. It seems that the parental connection between 
mother and child was, without reflection, considered a more important tie. 
Chikwamba was critical because it established that article 8cases are always fact-
sensitive, and that not all irregular migrantsare like the appellant in Ekinci.Whereas 
previously almost all migrants, whatever the individual facts, had been classed as Ekinci-type 
cases, now courts were mandated to do the opposite: to show why migrants should not be 
treated in the same way as the appellant in Chikwamba. Gender was not a material fact that 
would justify departing from that principle, so male migrants should benefit. The reality, 
however,was somewhat more complex, as discussion later will show. 
The second House of Lords case discussed here, EB(Kosovo), considered the effect of 
government delay on the proportionality of removal, affirmed the importance of individual 
decision-making, and finally and definitively dismissed the ‘insurmountable obstacles’ test 
that had allowed so many claims to be dismissed. The appellant here was male, but the 
narrative unambiguously evokes sympathy for his predicament. Aged 13, he was forced from 
his home in Kosovo, lost contact with his family and lived in refugee camps with his cousin, 
of a similar age before fleeing to the UK where, after a foster placement, he began living with 
his uncle and resumed his education. Shortly before he turned 18, he began a relationship 
with a young Somali woman in receipt of humanitarian protection and pregnant by another 
man who had abandoned her. The couple started to live together at the uncle’s house, the 
appellant raised the woman’s daughter as his own and they hoped to marry. However, after 
consideration of his asylum claim had been delayed for many years, it was eventually refused 
  
and the government planned to return him to Kosovo from where an entry clearance 
application might or might not succeed. Had his initial claim been dealt with more 
expeditiously, he would already havereceived indefinite leave to remain under previous 
policy.  
To open a House of Lords decision with such a narrative is unusual. More common 
would be an analysis of the legal issue. If facts were the first consideration, it is, in 
immigration cases, more usual to focus on the appellant’s immigration status, or lack of it, 
rather than their personal history.However on this occasion, the factual account, written by 
Lord Bingham in spare, elegant prose, immediately establishes the case as one concerning 
human interests and feelings, and the subsequent legal findings seem a natural and humane 
consequence of these. The appellant in this case is not the non-compliant and opportunistic 
male migrant of the lower court decisions, but a vulnerable and affectionate young man (a 
child when the story opens) seeking to create a family base with an equally insecure young 
woman and her child. The gender stereotype in this case had been subverted not by replacing 
the man with a woman, but by presenting a different kind of man, one who exhibited 
vulnerability and a capacity for caring extending beyond his own biological relatives that is 
more habituallyassociated with the feminine. 
As with Chikwamba, the case established a new framework for evaluating all those 
who came within the same broad factual matrix as the appellant.Both Chikwambaand EB 
(Kosovo) thus brought significant benefits for irregular migrants with family ties in the UK.It 
was, for example, no longer possible to reject a claim merely because there were no 
insurmountable obstacles to living abroad.
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However, thenext section will show that the 
decisions did not prefigure a brave new world in which the affective claims of irregular male 
migrants were given recognition. 
Reconstructing the Undeserving Male Family Migrant 
Anecdotal reports suggest that the immigration authorities did not change their 
practice more than marginally after these House of Lords cases.  Subsequent legal challenges 
which relied on the principles in Chikwamba and EB (Kosovo) were also largely 
unsuccessful.Factors that counted routinely against applicants before Chikwambaand EB 
(Kosovo) would often count against them afterwards. These included lengthy periods of 
irregular residence, even if it did not involve absconding or deception, or an otherwise ‘poor 
immigration history’;11 the absence of an ‘unassailable’ or ‘invincible’ right to live in the 
  
UK;
12
failure to comply with reporting or other conditions;
13
periods of delay which were not 
due to government failures, were shorter than the four and a half years that occurred in EB 
(Kosovo)or which did not result in unpredictable, inconsistent and unfair outcomes;
14
failure 
to provide information about the claimed relationship at the appropriate time;
15
 failure to 
show that those in a comparable position to the appellant had received earlier favourable 
decisions;
16
 and that a relationship was entered in the knowledge that immigration status was 
precarious.
17
 
The problem was that, just as the opportunistic male migrant was a construction, so 
were the appellants in the House of Lords cases.Factual ambiguities were glossed over in 
favour of an idealised presentation with the consequence that the category of successful 
claimants remained relatively narrow. While someof the later unsuccessful claims had 
weaknesses, almost all claims by irregular migrants are weak when viewed by the criteria 
discussed above. An irregular migrant, by definition, is non-compliant with immigration 
control. An asylum claim cannot be made unless the asylum-seeker is present on the territory 
and this almost always involves some form of illegal entry, as Lord Brown recognised in 
Chikwamba. However, the protection against prosecution provided by Article 31 of the 
Refugee Convention does not benefit those whose claims do not succeed and this is not 
always a predictable outcome. Asylum claims may failbecause specific legal conditions have 
not been met or because of adverse credibility findings that reflect confusion and trauma 
rather than deceit. The quality of the asylum determination process in the UK has been 
widely criticised.
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Return by the failed asylum seeker to the country of origin, while the 
logical consequence in law,maybe very difficult in practice.Any relationship involving 
anasylum seeker or irregular migrant will be entered in the knowledge that immigration status 
is precarious. These kinds of objection effectively exclude almost all irregular migrants from 
consideration, the very situation that existed before the House of Lords’ interventions.  Of 
course, there are degrees of non-compliance, and some irregular migrants may not evoke 
much sympathy. But human beings are fallible and make mistakes. Immigration control is 
impersonal, changeable and inefficient. Legal advice is not always available or of high 
quality. The basic need for human connection and companionship does not conveniently 
suspend itself for long periods while questions of status are resolved. It is disappointing to see 
how quickly lower courts and tribunals succeeded in resurrecting many of the barriers that 
Chikwambaand EB (Kosovo) had appeared to dismantle. 
  
Part of the problem is that Chikwamba and EB (Kosovo) had represented only a very 
partial deconstruction. This is not surprising. Courts have no legal or constitutional mandate 
to do more than ensure that immigration control is exercised in ways that comply with human 
rights obligations, including the qualified obligation in ECHR Article 8. The steps taken by 
the House of Lordsin that regard, which include the two cases discussed here, met with much 
government hostility and attempts to reverse them through rule changes (Wray 2013).  The 
Court would have been most anxious to avoid any suggestion that it was undermining 
government’s ability to control immigration or condoning non-compliance. However, by 
establishing so clearly the successful appellants as the converse of the non-compliant 
irregular male migrant, the decisions risked creating a set of unrealisable expectations that 
most migrants cannot meet. In fact, it is possible that even the parties to these cases might not 
have met them, had their cases been considered from a different perspective. Mrs 
Chikwamba’s asylum claim, for example, had been dismissed for lack of credibility, 
implying lack of honesty. She had two small children by a previous marriage and other 
family living in Harare. Her marriage had been entered and her daughter was bornwhen she 
knew her status was precarious. She knew also that the suspension of removals to Zimbabwe 
was temporary. There was doubt as to whether, if she applied from abroad as a spouse, she 
could comply with the requirements of the immigration rules.
iii
 In other words, while Ms 
Chikwamba had not absconded or evaded the authorities, many of the other objections made 
against the later failed applicants could also have been made against her. 
The appellant in EB (Kosovo) could as easily be described differently.  He did not 
mention his relationship until after refusal of his asylum claim. The adjudicator, quoted at 
length in paragraph 17 of the House of Lords judgment, noted that he had made no attempt to 
contact his family in Kosovo, found that his girlfriend could return to Kosovo with him, and 
considered that her child, who was one year old, would not yet have bonded with him. On the 
question of delay, the Tribunal had considered that ‘there is nothing in the nature of anything 
the appellant did or was done on his behalf by those representing or advising him to press for 
an earlier resolution of his claim’ (see para 19). Again, this alternative representation of the 
appellant rendered him almost indistinguishable from the majority of his unsuccessful peers.  
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While her other children are mentioned in passing in the House of Lords judgment, the other facts here are 
mentioned only in the adverse Court of Appeal decision from which Ms Chikwamba appealed: C (Zimbabwe) v 
SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 1779. 
  
In fact, while a few claims are particularlycompelling andsome others evoke little 
compassion, there is, in practice, no easily identified category of ‘meritorious’ cases that can 
be justifiably privileged above the rest. Most migrant stories are capable of multiple 
interpretations. As Charsley (2012:7-8) points out, that immigration advantages may be a 
consequence of marriage or even one motive for it does not mean that the marriage is entirely 
instrumental and that deep emotions are not also engaged. The presence of thousands of 
irregular migrants presents an ethical dilemma for any society. Their predominant gender, 
their ethnicity and their status mean that they are often regarded as a potent threat to the 
social fabric and to values of legality (cf. Griffiths, this volume). However, their affective ties 
to British residents, often built up during long periods of state inactivity in respect of their 
claims, make their removal potentially traumatic. This is not a dilemma that can be solved by 
the courts, who operate within delicately balanced constitutional and legalconstraints, or even 
easily by governments given the bidding war that is modern immigration policy, but it should 
not, for those reasons, go unacknowledged. It is also a dilemma that is tied to gender, a 
feature which, despite formal equality, has never disappeared and persistently re-emerges. 
Gender Resurrected 
The case of TG (Central African Republic) v SSHDwas decided by the Court of 
Appeal less than a month after Chikwamba.
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The legal issue was not the applicant’s claim to 
remain under the Chikwambaprinciple, but which body should make the decision. However, 
in reaching its decision, the Court observed some differences with Chikwamba. In particular, 
it was assumed that Mrs Chikwamba could not have left her child behind, whereas this was 
seen as possible for the father in TG. That the child would inevitably accompany the mother 
had, in fact, been assumed not established in Chikwamba(see the discussion above). It seems 
that motherhood gave rise to presumptions that fatherhood did not:   ‘ … it is quite clear that 
a very strong consideration in Chikwamba was the fact that it was the wife who was to be 
removed from the country, inevitably in the companionship of her four-year-old child’ 
(para.5). As discussed above, new models of fatherhood existbut they are not universally 
accepted and have been slow to permeate the contested arena of immigration control where 
the state’s interests in control are afforded such weight. 
Parenthoodthus permitted the legitimate expression of decision-making differentiated 
by gender and was becoming increasingly important in immigration claims. This was 
consonant with the growing priority awarded to the interests of children following the 
  
removal of the UK’s immigration exception to the UN Convention on the Rights of Child and 
the implementation of a statutory duty to safeguard and promote the welfare of children in the 
UK when making immigration decisions.
20
The 2011 Supreme Court decision of ZH 
(Tanzania) established that a child’s interests must be a primary consideration in immigration 
decisions involving their parents.
21
 Their interests include the practical ability to remain in 
their country of nationality or residence and this may mean that the custodial parent must also 
be given to leave to remain, however weak their claim in other respects.Fathers, who are 
more likely to be non-resident parents, may find that their relationship, whatever its 
emotional intensity, does not meet the threshold.
iv
 European Union law on the question has 
also focused on the ability of the child EU citizen to exercise their free movement rights for 
which the presence of only the custodial parent is necessary.
22
Even if the parents live 
together, while rights remain qualified (children’s interests are only a primary consideration 
not the only one), the ‘secondary’ parent, who is more likely to be the father,has a weaker 
claim. 
Gender has recently re-emerged in another way. It should be recalled that the removal 
of a family migrant is the not the end of the story. The migrant can apply to return as a 
partner or, if separated, to exercise contact with a child. The problems are practical: the 
difficulty, delay and cost involved in accessing visa facilities in some countries and showing 
compliance with entry criteria. Many migrants have managed to overcome these hurdles and 
re-unite in the UK, but for others this was not possible and separation became long-term or 
permanent. In theory, leave to enter the UK should be awarded on article 8 grounds but this 
is, in practice, almost never granted on first application, only on appeal from which the 
migrant is forcibly absent. 
The criteria for entry as a spouse have been recently made much more demanding, 
and this affects more male than female applicants.  Since July 2012, sponsors of partners 
must show that they have an income of at least £18,600 (more if children are also being 
sponsored). This income must be earned for at least six months or a year, depending on the 
employment situation, and be the sponsor’s own; welfare payments, third party support and 
the migrant’s own potential earnings are not counted. This new criterion discriminates 
indirectly against female sponsors who earn, on average, less than men and are more likely to 
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Compare for example, the treatment of the mother in VW (Uganda) and AB (Somalia) v SSHD [2009] EWCA 
Civ 5 and the father in R (on the application of Wray) [2010] EWHC 3301 (Admin). 
  
have caring responsibilities which prevent them finding work. As a result of the changes, 
47% of British citizens in employment do not qualify to bring in a partner but this rises to 
61% for women compared to 32% for men.
23
The migrant’s potential contribution either to 
income or child-care is completely disregarded.
24
The consequence for the mostly male 
irregular migrants that are the subject of this article is that fewer of them will now be eligible 
for a regular status. Those who have not yet been removed from the UK can at least provide 
childcare or other supportto their partner, even if they cannot work legally, but their status 
remains precarious. Those who are removed can only watch from the side-lines while their 
spouse attempts to create the necessary conditions for return. The Court of Appeal recently 
found that the financial criterion does not breacharticle 8 ECHR and is not discriminatory, a 
controversial judgment that is likely to be further appealed.
25
 In the meantime, gender, 
officially excluded from decision-making, remains a factorandmale applicants in heterosexual 
relationships (the vast majority of men who apply as partners), are at a disadvantage. While 
the government’s aim is to reduce all family immigration, not just by male migrants, and the 
new rules have had a serious impact on both genders, leading to much separation and distress 
(All Party Parliamentary Group on Migration 2013), the rule continues a longstanding 
narrative whose thread is consistent if not often articulated: the greater relative exclusion of 
male family migrants. 
Conclusion 
Some men pay a heavy price for the privilege of being masculine.Male family migrants, like 
other men in structurally weak positions, are attributed characteristics of masculinity which, 
if accepted, confirm the marginality of their emotional lives but which, if challenged, can 
result in criticism for instrumentalising their family lives. As this article has shown, the courts 
have only rarely allowed migrant men to transcend this bind, which serves vital purposes in 
terms of state interests in regulating migration.Even recent re-evaluations of the significance 
of parenthood to immigration decisions will usually assist mothers more than fathers. 
Claims by male family migrants are at odds with longstanding and often invisible 
norms about how masculinity conditions participation in family life,upon which new models 
of fatherhood have made only a limited impression.  For many decades, male family migrants 
were excluded specifically on the basis of their gender.  When this became an inadmissible 
criterion for discrimination, more subtle legal distinctions were created with much the same 
effect.The dramatic increase in numbers during the late 1990s and early 2000s of mostly male 
  
irregular migrants created a new scenario. No longer supplicants asking for admission, they 
were already present without status, could draw on human rights norms to found claims to 
remain, and were difficult to dislodge for both practical and legal reasons. They were 
regarded as illegitimate because they posed a threat to state control of migration and because 
they embodied fears about the readiness and capacity of mento exploit and manipulate 
emotional bonds for their own advantage.Given non-discrimination norms, such fears could 
only be expressed through general rules that implicated the entire category but whose 
justification was based, in part, on unspoken but widely shared beliefs about theirmasculinity. 
These rules were instigated by government and, in early years, upheld by the courts who were 
unwilling to challenge government hegemony and for whom the representation of applicants 
as male, non-compliant and opportunistic explained and reinforced decisions to exclude. 
Evidence of men’s involvement in family life was discounted or reduced to its practical 
elements. The outcome was that claims to remain in the UK based on affective relationships 
almost always failed after as well as before implementation of the Human Rights Act 1998. 
The House of Lords (now the Supreme Court), in the two cases discussed in this 
article, undermined these decisions not by explicitly deconstructing the non-compliant male 
migrant but by positing an opposing category of vulnerable family migrants, with deep-seated 
family ties to which more generous rules should apply. The judgments themselves set out 
general principles that should have assisted a wide range of migrants but were based on 
exemplars who were female or young, vulnerable and male. It was not difficult, in practice, 
for lower courts, anxious to avoid stepping into the taboo territory of immigration control, to 
distinguish subsequent cases because they did not match the apparently exacting factual 
standards of the successful claimants. In fact, even the successful claimants might, on a 
different reading, have failed to meet them. The exclusion of this category, and the gender 
assumptions that supported it, continued afterwards with relatively little impediment. In the 
meantime, gender distinctions began to be expressed in different ways, through a new, 
important but still relativized emphasis on parenthood and the imposition of much higher 
financial criteria which female sponsors of male applicants would find difficult to meet.  
Historically, it has always been more difficult for migrant men to have emotional 
attachments recognised as sufficient to found a legal claim. Family migration has been a 
feminised field, the counterpart of male dominance in other routes.  The pattern of excluding 
male family migrants has a protean character, re-emerging in different forms ever since 
immigration controls were first imposed.Even the intervention of the UK’s highest court has had 
  
limited impact because it did not address the underlying assumptions about these migrants. 
Gender is one of the most long-standing social categorisations of difference, ‘operative since the 
dawn of existence’ (Mahler and Pessar 2006: 29). While assumptions about femininity have been 
re-evaluated through a gender analysis, masculinity has only relatively recently started to receive 
the same attention. Scholarshipon masculinity has not yet made much impact in an area such as 
immigration control, where state interests are so strongly asserted and where many beliefs are 
congruent with what it is expedient to assume about unwanted migrants.  The result is that it is 
very difficult to eliminate from the regulatory regime the assumption that men who claim an 
immigration advantage through a family relationship areemotionally robust and can withstand 
separation, are opportunistic in their relationships and are lessintensely involved than mothers 
with their children.  
As discussed in the introduction to this collection, claims by men in family law and under 
asylum have evoked ambivalent or hostile responses connected to their gender (Collier 2010: 
chapter 7; Spijkerboer 2000; Griffiths,this collection; De Hart, this collection). To this list may 
be added men seeking admission or a right to remain as family members. As with asylum, there 
is particular resistance as states regard themselves as havingan interest in minimising the strength 
of claims based on affective ties. Migrant men’s emotional lives continue to be treated as 
marginal to their lives, ‘a thing apart’.v 
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